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The Social Relations of Consumption: Corporate Law 
and the Meaning of Consumer Culture 
David G. Yosifon* 
ABSTRACT 
 A mature assessment of the society we are making for ourselves, 
and the legacy we are leaving to the future, must come to terms with 
consumer culture.  Theoretical discourse, as well as common experience, 
betray persistent ambiguity about what consumerism means to and says 
about us.  In this Article, I argue that this ambiguity can in part be 
explained by examining the social relations of consumption in 
contemporary society. These involve, crucially, the relationship between 
producer and consumer that is dictated by corporate governance law, 
and embodied in the decision-making dynamics of the directors who 
command corporate operations. The enigmatic nature of consumer 
culture can be understood as resulting from a lack of integrity in the 
social relations between corporations and consumers. Having made this 
diagnosis, I argue that the character of our consumer culture can be 
improved by introducing greater sincerity into the social relations of 
consumption. These concerns contribute to a broader set of arguments 
for reforming corporate governance law to require corporate directors 
to attend to the interests of multiple stakeholders in corporate decision-
making, and not just the interests of shareholders. Regardless of 
whether one embraces this prescription, the analysis developed here can 
enrich our understanding of what is at stake in debates about our 
corporate law.  
 
* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. Dyosifon@scu.edu. I would like 
to thank Mary Sexton for her expert assistance in obtaining research materials. My thanks to 
Stephen Diamond, Pratheepan Gulasekaram, David Ball, William Woodward, Tyler Ochoa, 
Michelle Oberman, David Sloss, and Stephen Yosifon for comments on an earlier draft. I am 
indebted to James Livingston, John Gillis, Scott Sandage, Peter Stearns, and Jon Hanson for 
their influence on my thinking about these issues. Any insight here is owed to them. All errors 
are mine alone. 
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“There is something in the structure of the human animal which 
compels him to produce superfluously.” 
Norman O. Brown1 
“To ignore it is to court nostalgia. To engage with it, however, is 
to risk . . . mak[ing] the same point over and over: technological 
consumerism is an infernal machine, technological consumerism is 
an infernal machine.” 
Jonathan Franzen2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consumer culture is a defining feature of modern life. It is also a 
cardinal normative concern. Understanding what consumerism 
“means” is essential to a mature assessment of the society we are 
making for ourselves, and the legacy we are leaving to the future. 
Mainstream economists and policymakers perennially insist that 
 
 1.  NORMAN O. BROWN, LIFE AGAINST DEATH: THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL MEANING 
OF HISTORY 256 (1959). 
 2.  Jonathan Franzen, Perchance to Dream: In the Age of Images, A Reason to Write 
Novels, HARPER’S, Apr. 1996, at 35, 43. 
YOSIFON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2016  3:35 PM 
1309 The Social Relations of Consumption 
 1311 
consumption must be encouraged in order to fuel development and 
ensure prosperity.3 Yet there is persistent ambiguity in theoretical 
discourse, and common experience, about the meaning of our 
consumer culture. In this Article, I argue that this ambiguity can, in 
part, be explained by examining the social relations of consumption 
in contemporary society. These social relations involve, crucially, the 
relationship between producer and consumer that is dictated by 
corporate governance law, and embodied in the decision-making 
dynamics of the directors who command corporate operations. The 
enigmatic nature of consumer culture can be understood, to some 
useful extent, as resulting from a lack of integrity in the social 
relations between corporations and consumers. 
If our consumer culture is (partially) a function of the social 
relations of consumption, then perhaps we can improve the character 
of that culture by introducing greater integrity into those social 
relations. This can be accomplished through the reform of corporate 
law. Specifically, I claim that legitimate concerns about consumer 
culture contribute to a broader set of arguments for reforming 
corporate governance law to require corporate directors to attend to 
the interests of multiple stakeholders in corporate decision-making, 
and not just the interests of shareholders. Regardless of whether one 
embraces this prescription, the analysis developed here can enrich 
our understanding of what is at stake in debates about our corporate 
law: what it is, what it does, and what it might do. 
Groucho Marx once said, “When I hear the word culture I reach 
for my wallet.”4 Legal scholars, too, seem to worry that cultural 
analysis will operate as the pretty ruse of a theoretical pick-pocket, 
leaving us dazzled, perhaps, but poorer in understanding than when 
we started out. The conventional categories of legal analysis favor 
inquiries that are plainly tractable, even quantifiable. This is 
 
 3.  See infra text accompanying notes  21−23 (describing the role that the “Keynesian 
consensus” plays in conventional economic and policymaking discourse). 
 4.  Peter Borsay & Callum Brown, Review of Books, 22 URBAN HISTORY 139, 139 
(1995) (quoting Groucho Marx). Groucho’s quip was a variation on the line attributed to the 
Nazi leader Hermann H. Goering: “Whenever I hear the word culture, I reach for my 
revolver.” The Goering quote is apparently apocryphal. See PAUL F. BOLLER, JR. & JOHN 
GEORGE, THEY NEVER SAID IT: A BOOK OF FAKE QUOTES, MISQUOTES, AND MISLEADING 
ATTRIBUTIONS 36 (1989) (“This statement actually . . . comes from Hanns Johst’s drama 
Schlageter, produced at the State Playhouse in Berlin in 1933.”). It is conceivable that Goering 
was familiar with the Johst play and used the line himself. 
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motivated by an estimable desire to get at the usable knowledge that 
objective, quasi-scientific approaches promise. It is also driven by a 
scrupulous commitment to avoiding methods that risk illiberally 
celebrating or condemning particular values or ways of life, which 
cultural analysis might seem to imply.5 
Mainstream corporate law scholarship exemplifies this tendency. 
It has principally been concerned with analyzing the shareholder 
predicament in corporate affairs, construed in terms of financial risk 
and return. “Progressive” or critical corporate law scholarship looks 
beyond the shareholder’s stake in corporate operations, but also has 
largely eschewed cultural assessment, tethering its analysis instead to 
countable versions of corporate “harm” such as environmental 
externalities, declining wages, or tobacco-related deaths.6 Even 
cutting-edge scholarship marshaling the insights of social psychology 
for corporate law study has restricted its attention to categories that 
are at least in principle measurable, such as “consumer risk 
perception.”7 The insights supplied by these scholarly tranches are 
crucial, but they leave out of the conversation an important aspect of 
what we want to talk about when we talk about corporations. It lets 
pass, and thus gives a pass to, the cultural significance of corporate 
law, particularly as it relates to consumerism. This Article is 
concerned with developing a way of thinking about consumer 
culture within corporate law discourse.  
The great anthropologist Clifford Geertz defined “culture” in 
straightforward, encompassing terms, as “a system of inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men 
 
 5.  See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2007) 
(examining the psychological limits of liberalism). The exception is that corporate law scholars 
have given some attention to the culture of the corporate boardroom. See, e.g., STEPHEN 
BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 77–104 
(2008) (exploring the utility of boardroom culture as a means of encouraging directors to 
work honestly and effectively).  Examination of this culture, however, has been for the purpose 
of understanding how firms act or fail to act in the shareholder interest, without any study of 
the general cultural implications of that activity. 
 6.  See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1467–1552 (1999) [hereinafter 
Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously] (arguing that profit-maximizing tobacco 
companies exploited psychological vulnerabilities of tobacco consumers for decades, in ways 
that conventional economic and legal analysis were unprepared to assess). 
 7.  See David G. Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 681 (2008) (reviewing scholarship of this sort). 
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[and women] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their 
knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”8 My focus on 
“consumer culture” is an effort to consider what our consumerism 
means to us and what it says about us, as individuals and as a society. 
I do not explore here the content of consumer culture. I will not 
assess particular discourses on sex, gender, race, or class occasioned 
by consumer culture generally, or through particular consumer 
cultures of smoking, electronics, or fast food.9 That sort of work is 
fascinating, and sometimes even credible, but here I am trying to 
characterize consumer culture at a more general level of abstraction, 
and from a particular vantage. I am concerned with the process 
through which consumer culture comes into being. Specifically, I am 
concerned with the way that corporate law shapes the social relations 
of consumption, and thus, shapes consumer culture. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part II describes the 
fundamentally ambiguous, or ambivalent, depiction of consumer 
culture that emerges from those intellectual traditions that have 
intensely grappled with it. Part III critiques the scant and under-
theorized role that assessment of consumer culture has played within 
corporate law scholarship. Part IV examines the social relations of 
consumption as they are described by contemporary corporate 
governance law, and embodied in the decision-making dynamics of 
corporate boards of directors. My claim is that the problem of 
“insincerity” described in Part IV must be understood as an essential 
component of the social relations of consumption in our society, and 
thus as central to the meaning of consumer culture. Part V describes 
a reform program that aims to make corporate decision-making 
more sincere, which, among other benefits, may give consumer 
culture more integrity, and make the meaning of consumer culture 
less ambiguous. Part VI gives a brief conclusion. 
 
 8.  CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CULTURES 87, 89 (1973). 
 9.  But see infra text accompanying notes 18−20 (noting scholarship on the 
relationship between consumerism and landmark civil rights movements pursuing racial, 
gender, and sexual orientation equality). 
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II. THE AMBIVALENT MEANING OF CONSUMER CULTURE 
While mainstream corporate law scholars have not struggled with 
consumer culture, intellectuals in other disciplines have evaluated it 
with interest, and usually skepticism. A robust tradition in academic 
cultural history explains the emergence of consumerism in what 
might generally be called “functionalist” terms. Mass consumerism 
emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a 
reliable means of channeling a wide range of human desires in an 
efficient, predictable manner that was compatible with the 
formalized, sanitized way of life emerging under corporate 
capitalism.10 For the working-class, consumerism became a 
compensatory salve for the ignominy of industrialized labor. For the 
wealthy, conspicuous consumption became a way of grappling with 
status anxiety in a world with unprecedented social mobility.11 For 
American culture as a whole, consumer culture in the twentieth 
century became a central organizing principle of individual and 
associational identity, replacing the centrality of the worker and civic-
minded ethic that had theretofore dominated the American scene.12 
Cultural analysts have been spooked by consumer culture from 
the beginning. Consumer culture, many have said, sterilizes and 
homogenizes the otherwise messy but sublime human condition. It 
promises transcendence but it does not deliver. Instead, it sets us 
back. This long-standing critical tradition can be traced at least to 
William Wordsworth—“Getting and spending, we lay waste our 
powers . . . / We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!”13—and 
has echoed in American letters from Thorstein Veblen to Bob Dylan, 
 
 10.  See, e.g., COLIN CAMPBELL, THE ROMANTIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF MODERN 
CONSUMERISM (1987); T.J. JACKSON LEARS, NO PLACE OF GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 1880-1920 (1981); PETER N. STEARNS, 
AMERICAN COOL: CONSTRUCTING A TWENTIETH-CENTURY EMOTIONAL STYLE 209–
14 (1994). 
 11.  See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899). 
 12.  See Richard Wightman Fox & T.J. Jackson Lears, Introduction to THE CULTURE 
OF CONSUMPTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1890, at vii (Richard 
Wightman Fox & T.J. Jackson Lears eds., 1983); STEPHEN NISSENBAUM, THE BATTLE FOR 
CHRISTMAS 139 (1996) (arguing that “[c]onsumer capitalism and civic virtue were not 
commonly associated with each other in early nineteenth-century America,” but the 
emergence of the modern Christmas rituals “helped intensify and legitimize a commercial kind 
of consumerism”). 
 13.  William Wordsworth, The World Is Too Much with Us, in POEMS 122 (1807). 
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the latter of whom warned that: “advertising signs they con / You 
into thinking you’re the one / That can do what’s never been done 
/ That can win what’s never been won / Meantime life outside goes 
on / All around you.”14 Consumer culture, on this reading, is 
manipulative and degrading.15 
The most strident critics of consumerism claim that the situation 
is worse than what Dylan described. It is not so much that consumer 
culture keeps you from the life that is going on all around you—the 
fact is, according to the most mournful tally, there is no longer any 
real life going on anywhere other than the shadow, shallow life of 
consumerism. These people say things like: “All that once was 
directly lived has become mere representation.”16 The domination of 
consumer culture empties out and replaces other forms of meaning 
from social life, in particular, meanings that previously were made in 
community, politics, and religion.17 
However, a different tradition of cultural studies celebrates 
consumer culture as a highly effective vehicle of personal and social 
liberation. Personal liberation, because consumerism allows 
individuals an accessible means of escape from the narrow terms of 
identity otherwise provided only by stultifying tradition or work. 
Social liberation, because consumer culture became a crucial site of 
various civil rights movements. Consumer goods have literally 
created and carried the message of equality, quintessentially through 
 
 14.  BOB DYLAN, It’s Alright, Ma (I’m Only Bleeding), on BRINGING IT ALL BACK 
HOME (Columbia 1965). Of course, Dylan here commoditizes the con of the 
commoditization of difference. This does not dispel but rather more deeply demonstrates the 
infinite loop of commoditization on which the critics of consumerism dwell, and despair. See 
also VEBLEN, supra note 11. 
 15.  Even as we can locate criticism of “consumerism” as a distinctly historical 
phenomena, we can also see it as a more-or-less universal feature of reflection on the human 
condition. Wordsworth’s lament about our “sordid boon” was written in 1807, long before 
the rise of large corporations or modern consumer culture in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. We could probably make biographical arguments about Wordsworth being 
at the vanguard of a bourgeoning cultural phenomenon, but truly we could also surely find 
expressions like this offered by sensitive thinkers since we first climbed down from the trees, or 
at least since we started planting the beer. The issue I am pursuing here is what our 
institutional arrangements do, in particular what corporate law does, to exacerbate, mitigate, 
enliven, subdue, rectify, or improve this eternal aspect of the human condition. 
 16.  GUY DEBORD, THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE 12 (Donald Nicholson-Smith 
trans., Zone Books 1999) (1967). 
 17.  See id. at 12–14. 
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music, but also through books, movies, and television. This 
happened in the United States in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century, and at the end of the twentieth century it gave 
shape to the “velvet revolution” in the Soviet bloc, where the desire 
for consumer culture forced political change.18 Consumerism may be 
a somewhat vapid or fleeting approach to identity, but its 
superficiality replaces otherwise pernicious, oppressive, and 
ultimately, boring discourses on identity that draw their authority 
from racism, sexism, classicism, and hetero-normativity.19 Consumer 
culture expands the possibilities of not just material pleasures, but 
also our inner life. Advertising is testimony to our abundance—
personal and social. The acolytes of this tradition insist, contra 
Dylan, that, far from being a con, advertising is “the last 
utopian idiom.”20 
In a sense, everything depends upon which of these 
interpretations of consumer culture, the condemning or the 
celebratory, is right. What seems to be at stake is, in the words of 
James Livingston, “whether emotional frugality or expenditure is the 
proper structure of [our] souls.”21 At stake too is the attitude that we 
should have, skeptical or celebratory, to recurring, mainstream 
macro-economic and political claims about the importance of 
consumption activity, and the imperative of encouraging ever-greater 
levels of consumption, in order to ensure economic development 
and political stability.22 Whether this “Keynesian consensus” is good 
 
 18.  See generally LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF 
MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2003); see also Elisa Glick, The Dialectics of 
Dandyism, 48 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 129–30 (2001) (emphasizing the role of consumer 
culture in both identity formation and political engagement in the gay rights movement). 
 19.  See generally DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE BOURGEOIS VIRTUES: ETHICS FOR AN 
AGE OF COMMERCE 25–26 (2006) (emphasizing the bleak and oppressive nature of cultural 
life for the vast majority of people in the pre-modern era). 
 20.  JAMES LIVINGSTON, AGAINST THRIFT: WHY CONSUMER CULTURE IS GOOD FOR 
THE ECONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND YOUR SOUL 115−16 (2011) [hereinafter 
LIVINGSTON, AGAINST THRIFT] (“Could advertising be the thesaurus of our real feelings, the 
indispensable, vernacular language we use to plot our positions on the emotional atlas that is 
everyday life?”). 
 21.  Id. at xiii. 
 22.  The Keynesian outlook emphasizes the urgency of encouraging consumption. This 
is because consumers have a propensity to increase consumption when their income increases, 
but not by as much as their income is increased. Keynes called this “a fundamental 
psychological law.” JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
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economics is beyond the present inquiry.23 My point is rather to 
draw critical attention to the relentless, uncritical emphasis that the 
consensus outlook places on spurring consumer demand. We must 
know what to make of such consumption, and what it is making 
of us. 
III. THE ABSENCE OF CONSUMER CULTURE IN CORPORATE 
THEORY 
Critical assessment of consumerism has not been a feature of 
traditional corporate law scholarship. The focus of the field has 
instead been on one important problem in the social relations of 
production under corporate capitalism: the separation of ownership 
and control in enterprise. The problems inherent to this mode of 
organization have been evident at least since Adam Smith wrote the 
following in The Wealth of Nations: 
The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a court 
[think board] of directors. This court . . . [is] subject, in many 
respects, to the control of a general court of proprietors [think 
shareholders]. But the greater part of those proprietors seldom 
pretend to understand anything of the business of the company 
[think rational ignorance] . . . . The directors of such 
companies . . . being the managers rather of other people’s money 
than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
 
INTEREST, AND MONEY 96 (First Harbinger ed., 1964). This consumer habit becomes a core 
element in “Keynesianism.” Because consumers save a greater portion of their income, demand 
will ultimately be insufficient to justify productive investment of capital. This under-investment 
means under-employment. Workers seeking to provide for their own future consumption 
refuse to supply the current demand sufficient to justify the current investment that would 
employ them. This creates a “liquidity trap” or a “savings glut” in which consumers are 
unwilling to spend their earnings and business is unwilling to invest in productive activity. 
Under such conditions, Keynesianism calls on policymakers to take steps to 
encourage consumption. 
 23.  The familiar motto, “We are all Keynesians now,” is quasi-apocryphally attributed 
to Milton Friedman, who was quoted to that effect in a Time Magazine cover story in 1965. 
We Are All Keynesians Now, TIME, Dec. 31, 1965, at 74. Friedman, however, insisted that 
what he actually said was, “In one sense, we are all Keynesians now; in another, nobody is any 
longer a Keynesian.” See Milton Friedman, Letter to the Editor, TIME, Feb. 4, 1966, at 15. I 
am not focused here on proving the universality of Keynesianism. It is enough for present 
purposes to assert that this is a widespread view in both formal economics and 
ordinary politics. 
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partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their 
own . . . . Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, 
more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company 
[the agency problem].24 
This shareholder agency problem has continually commanded 
the attention of corporate law scholars. Its modern statement is 
pinned to Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ totemic The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, published in 1932, and its 
“formalization” credited to Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s 
Theory of the Firm article in 1976.25 Every year, still, the law reviews 
are filled with studies and arguments treating the problem with ever-
greater nuance. 
To properly characterize consumer culture, we must begin close 
to this canonical starting place. The corporate reorganization of the 
economy that separated ownership and control in production also 
introduced new social relations of consumption, by separating 
production and consumption. This disaggregation created a 
consumer agency problem that has received little attention by 
scholars. Before the mid-nineteenth century, most business activity 
was organized through familial relationships, and most of what was 
consumed was produced by relatives or neighbors.26 Where 
consumers produce for themselves or in affective associational 
arrangements, such as family or kin networks, the interests of 
 
 24.  ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 849 (London, Methuen & Co., 1904) 
(1776). As with Wordsworth, see supra note 13, Smith’s writing could be seen as prescient, as 
he was describing a social problem that would not become widespread, or appreciated as 
widespread, until several generations after he lived. In another sense, however, again as with 
Wordsworth, Smith is describing a problem that has been with humankind in all epochs, 
whenever some have purported to work on behalf of others. My focus is on the particular 
challenges presented by these universal human predicaments in our time, in our systems, and 
within our corporate law. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE 
COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003) (tracing agency problems 
in business operations back at least to Ancient Egypt). 
 25.  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 26.  See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 17 (1977) (asserting that “the family remained the 
basic business unit” well into the nineteenth century); see also Christopher Clark, Household 
Economy, Market Exchange and the Rise of Capitalism in the Connecticut Valley, 1800-1860, 12 
J. SOC. HIST. 169, 173 (1973) (describing “networks of exchange relationships . . . [among] 
neighbors and relatives” that formed the basis of consumption patterns for rural families in the 
early nineteenth century). 
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production and consumption are aligned.27  The problem is that 
under such “primitive” modes of economic organization, relatively 
little is produced or consumed, and the ravages of depravation are 
more threatening than the depravities of abundance. 
The corporate organization of production introduced new social 
relations of consumption. Now the consumer stood at arms-length 
from the hand that would feed, clothe, and delight her, and the 
“morals of the market place,”28 rather than those of hearth or 
neighborhood, described the atmosphere of exchange. When, as 
under corporate capitalism, production and consumption are so 
separated, “it cannot be well expected,”29 to borrow Adam Smith’s 
verbiage, that corporate directors “will watch over [consumer 
interests] with the same anxious vigilance”30 with which consumers 
would watch over it themselves. We should anticipate that 
“negligence and profusion” regarding the “affairs” of consumers 
“must always prevail” in corporate operations.31 Yet this consumer 
agency problem has rarely been identified, and has never been 
pursued with the academic doggedness that has served the 
shareholder agency problem.32 
Canonical corporate theory compounds its error of ignoring the 
consumer agency problem when it insists that solving the allegedly 
all-important shareholder agency problem requires shareholder 
primacy in corporate governance. In an effort to mitigate 
“negligence and profusion,”33 the law binds corporate directors with 
the yoke of fiduciary obligation to the shareholders. So charged, and 
 
 27.  Cf. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 733, 749−59 (2005) (describing operational discretion in the operation of small, non-
corporate businesses). Elhauge argues that corporate managers have a similar latitude to 
engage in operational restraint. He is wrong about that as a matter of positive law. See David 
G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L. REV. 181, 200–03 (2013), 
but the idea is useful when considering a reform program. See infra Part V. 
 28.  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) (contrasting 
the moral expectations “trodden by the crowd” with those expected of a fiduciary). 
 29.  See SMITH, supra note 24, at 849. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS. L. 
REV. 253 (2009) (analyzing and critiquing the role of the consumer in dominant 
corporate theory). 
 33.  See SMITH, supra note 24, at 849. 
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operating in a broader economic and cultural context that deepens 
their fealty to shareholders, directors are moved to search for profits 
wherever they might be found, including, where possible, by 
manipulating non-shareholders, including consumers. Adam Smith 
was not as impressed with this problem as he was the shareholder 
agency problem: 
The prejudices of some political writers against shopkeepers and 
tradesmen are altogether without foundation . . . . Some of them, 
perhaps, may sometimes decoy a weak customer to buy what he has 
no occasion for. This evil, however, is of too little importance to 
deserve the public attention . . . . It is not the multitude of 
alehouses, to give the most suspicious example, that occasions a 
general disposition to drunkenness among the common people; 
but that disposition, arising from other causes, necessarily gives 
employment to a multitude of alehouses.34 
Corporations generate profits by discerning and serving 
consumer “disposition[s],” not by “decoy[ing]” them.35 Whatever 
meaning there is in consumer culture depends entirely on the 
consumer. And this too has been the position taken by Smith’s 
modern heirs in corporate law scholarship, down again to Michael 
Jensen, Oliver Williamson, or Stephen Bainbridge.36 
One early twentieth-century economist did come close to 
formulating the consumer predicament in the agency-problem terms 
that I am urging. In his 1923 book, The Control of Industry, Dennis 
Robertson (a mentor to Ronald Coase) dedicated a chapter to 
examining “Industry and the Consumer.”37 Robertson cataloged 
“the grievances, real or imaginary,” of consumers under the capitalist 
 
 34.  SMITH, supra note 24, at 407. Here we see already, in Smith, a prejudice that 
continues to haunt corporate law discourse. Analysts who deal with shareholder exploitation 
get the neutral title “economist,” while those who address the consumer predicament are 
maligned as “political writers.” Id. 
 35.  See id. 
 36.  See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 25; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5. 
 37.  Robertson’s book furnished the line quoted and made famous by Coase, comparing 
corporations to “islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation, like 
lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.” D. H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF 
INDUSTRY 84 (1923), quoted in R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 
388 (1937). 
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system.38 He includes familiar protests against advertisers who 
“[f]rom every hoarding and newspaper . . . explain vociferously to 
the consumer what he wants, until he almost—but not quite—comes 
to believe that it is true,”39 among other complaints.40 Robertson 
reviews prevailing (then and now) solutions to these problems, most 
of which involve the palliatives of general welfare legislation.41 
Hitting on the consumer agency problem formulation, Robertson 
writes that such remedies, “all embody, in one form or another, the 
ambitious notion of undoing the great division of function which 
first took place when Eve picked the apple and Adam ate it, and 
reintegrating the consumer with the producer.”42 
There was promise in Robertson’s image, but he did not quite 
see it. There may have been a division of labor between Adam and 
Eve, but there was no agency problem as such. As spouses, their 
well-being was inextricably intertwined.43 There is no tension or 
division of interests between production and consumption where the 
functions are separated under such affective conditions. Eve has no 
incentive to malinger or thieve, since any harm that comes to Adam 
from bad fruit is suffered by her too. Love aligns their interests 
better than any stock option plan could hope to. It is true that Eve 
faltered in her production responsibilities, and that Adam bears the 
burden of her lapse when he consumes.44 They are both expelled 
from Paradise. But there is a difference between what it means to 
lose Paradise through manipulation or indifference, and what it 
means to lose it through loving incompetence. She meant well.45 The 
social relations attending the consumption are crucial to 
characterizing its meaning, its significance, and the world that the 
 
 38.  Id. at 101. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 101–03. 
 41.  Id. at 103. But see infra text accompanying notes 104–09 (criticizing the view that 
corporate abuses can be effectively policed through general welfare legislation). 
 42.  ROBERTSON, supra note 37, at 103. 
 43.  “Therefore shall a man [or woman] . . . cleave unto his [or her] wife [or husband]: 
and they shall be one flesh.” Genesis 2:24. 
 44.  “God called unto Adam . . . Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded 
thee that thou shouldest not eat?” Genesis 3:9–11. 
 45.  “[W]hen the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that is was pleasant 
to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did 
eat, and gave also unto her husband with her . . . .” Genesis 3:6. 
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consumption is making. The consequences of their consumption, 
calculated only by countable things, like lost leisure time in the 
Garden, or hours later suffered tilling arid soil or engaged in painful 
childbirth, may be the same whether their expulsion was a result of 
being fooled or being foolish. But there is a subtler meaning to their 
consumer experience that resides in the nature of the relationship 
between producer and consumer. It is the difference between the 
Snake fooling Eve into taking the apple, and Eve (merely) foolishly 
giving the apple to Adam.46 
Emphasizing the meaning that abides in the social relations of 
consumption compels a departure from focusing on marketing and 
advertising as the oracle of consumer culture.  Or, put better, 
showcasing the social relations of consumption adds an important 
variable to the hermeneutics of consumer culture that otherwise puts 
more pressure on marketing analysis than it can effectively bear.  We 
cannot understand the consumer culture of the Garden only by 
evaluating the words and manner deployed in saying, “try this 
luscious apple.”47 The Devil might have used razzle-dazzle. Eve may 
have used sex appeal. The formal attributes of the speech can tell us 
something about what the apple consumption “signified,” beyond 
the crunch and sweetness of the fruit. But to more deeply 
understand the meaning of the consumption, to understand the soul 
that it makes and the cultural world that it creates, we must 
understand also the motive and institutional role of the producer in 
consort with the consumer.48 This factor has largely been missing 
from both condemning and celebratory analyses of consumer 
culture, and it is what I mean to capture here.49 
 
 46.  “[T]he serpent was more subtil than any beast of the field . . . .” Genesis 3:1. 
 47.  See supra text accompanying notes 42–46. 
 48.  The poets of labor have made a rich tradition of showing the unsuitability of the 
Garden of Eden for Adam and Eve, who, such poets insist, could only really be human 
through their work. See, e.g., LOUIS UNTERMEYER, Eve Speaks, in THESE TIMES 183, 187 
(1917) (“Better the long uncertainty of toil . . . Than this enforced and rotting indolence.”). 
But for poets of consumerism the misery of the Garden must be the perversity of the miser, 
the absurdity of allowing the apple to be wasted in eternal exchange value, a deposit of 
humanity’s obedience to God’s command. Eve and Adam, one might say in a footnote, 
liberated the apple from this reification, and redeemed its use value. See LIVINGSTON, AGAINST 
THRIFT, supra note 20. 
 49.  For example, a 500-page collection of riveting essays by leading cultural historians 
on the emergence of consumerism, contains nothing whatsoever on corporate law or corporate 
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 My use of the “consumer agency problem” formulation 
replicates categories of analysis used in conventional corporate 
theory, because those categories have generated great insight in the 
traditional approach, and might usefully be redirected. Similarly, I 
use the “social relations of consumption” framework in an effort to 
redeploy an important insight of Marxism, an intellectual tradition 
that burns some distance from the flame of mainstream corporate 
theory, but which on this issue may be similarly illuminating. Marx 
used the term “social relations of production” to reference the set of 
relationships in which humans become enmeshed in order to sustain 
themselves. Different methods of production involve different kinds 
of social relations. For example, the social relations that a subsistence 
farmer must enter into in order to survive are very different from the 
social relations to which a wage laborer in a mechanized factory must 
submit in order to sustain herself. Marx emphasized that the social 
relations of production are essential components of the way human 
beings think about themselves and the world around them.50 He 
famously wrote: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their existence, but their social existence that determines their 
consciousness.”51 While “the social relations of production” has 
proven a useful analytic tool,52 it gives short shrift to the role of 
consumption in shaping men and women’s sense of their lives.  As the 
contracts scholars Ian Macneil wrote in 1983, “[t]he social relations 
of consumption have perhaps in the past . . . [been] largely 
 
governance. CONSUMPTION AND THE WORLD OF GOODS (John Brewer & Roy Porter eds., 
1993). This oversight is routine in discussions of consumer culture. 
 50.  See Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of 
Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1347 (1979) (internal citations 
omitted) (explaining that a Marxist “social psychology . . . begins with the idea that people 
interpret the material conditions of their existence in ways that make their experience coherent 
and adds that the primary, though not exclusive, material conditions shaping those 
interpretations are the social relations of production”) (citation omitted). 
 51.  See KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 21 
(Maurice Dobb ed., S.W. Ryazankay trans., 1970) (1904). This assertion, if not taken too 
rigidly, is entirely consistent with the claims of contemporary social psychology, which 
emphasizes the often unseen influences of situation in shaping human cognition, preference 
formation, and decision-making. See generally, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational 
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L. REV. 1 (2004) 
[hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character] (summarizing and assessing 
psychological research of this sort). 
 52.  See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 50. 
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dependent on the social relations of production. They have now, 
however, become increasingly independent and, in the developed 
world at least, perhaps a good deal more important than the material 
social relations of production.”53   
The separation of production and consumption under corporate 
capitalism implicates another Marxist concept that has no direct 
analogy in canonical corporate law scholarship, but which may be 
usefully exploited (no pun intended) in the assessment of consumer 
culture, and that is the idea of “commodity fetishism.”54 Marx 
emphasized that under capitalist social relations of production, labor 
becomes “alienated” from the goods that it creates.55 Workers no 
longer identify with the products of their labor (as they do under 
pre-capitalist conditions), and the role and identity of labor is 
invisible to the consumer of what is produced. Instead of reflecting 
the labor that made them, commodities come to be conceived in 
terms of their “exchange value,” that is, the amount of money they 
can be sold for on the open market. To consumers, this “exchange 
value” seems to exist sui generis in the commodity, like the power 
presumed to be present in the amulets of reverential fetish in “the 
mist-enveloped regions of the religious world.”56 
Commodity fetishism is a powerful concept, but it is typically 
used to emphasize the negation of labor from the cultural 
significance of commodities, rather than to affirmatively assess the 
relationship of the consumer to commodities. This is a symptom of 
the over-emphasis on the social relations of production, and too little 
focus on consumption.  Where Marxism-influenced scholars do 
examine the consumer relationship to fetishized commodities, they 
 
 53.  Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 
387 n.151 (1983). See also id. at 406 n.202 (“[I]n any given historical setting, the social 
relations of consumption may be of more significant social effect than the social relations of 
production.”). Macneil does not appear to have pursued this idea in these terms in his 
subsequent voluminous writings, and his is the only use of the phrase “social relations of 
consumption” in the Westlaw database of Law Reviews and Journals (compared with seventy-
four hits for “the social relations of production”). Search of Westlaw database of Law Reviews 
and Journals, August 4, 2015. 
   54.  KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 81–96 (Ben 
Fowkes trans., Penguin Classics 1992) (1867) [hereinafter MARX, CAPITAL] (explicating 
“[t]he fetishism of commodities and the secret thereof”). 
   55.  Id. 
 56.  See MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 54, at 83. 
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seem to reify the alienation Marx describes, rather than penetrating 
through it. Earlier, for example, I referenced the work of James 
Livingston, who celebrates consumerism as a means of liberating 
commodities from fetishized exchange value status, and 
personalizing their use values.57 Analysts in this mode seem to leave it 
entirely to the consumer to endow the commodity with her own 
meaning, rather than construing that meaning in terms that are 
suffused with the social relations of consumption in the 
corporate milieu.  
Instead of either condemning or celebrating consumer culture, I 
am aiming to explain the role that corporate law plays in sustaining 
these conflicting interpretations. Corporate capitalism may catalyze 
the alienation of labor from the goods it produces, but corporate 
social relations nevertheless constrain, shape, and contextualize the 
meaning of the consumptive occasion.  Corporate law, of course, 
does not exhaustively describe the social relations of consumption in 
our society.  But it provides one route into a characterization that 
may help explain the ambiguities of consumer culture that are at 
once so familiar, and so contradictory. 
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS A SOCIAL RELATION 
OF CONSUMPTION 
The emergence of large, publicly traded corporations in the 
twentieth century reorganized capitalism in a way that minimized 
the role of individual capitalists and wealthy families, and elevated 
the role of professional corporate directors.58 To solve the 
shareholder agency problem, corporate law introduces a particular 
 
 57.  See LIVINGSTON, AGAINST THRIFT, supra note 20, at xv. 
 58.  See JAMES LIVINGSTON, PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1850–1940, at 100 (1994) (“[T]he transition from proprietary to 
corporate capitalism entails the social (not the literal) death of capitalists in the same sense that 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism entailed the social death of the landed nobility.”); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 24–25.  While executive officers and other corporate 
functionaries are crucial figures in the social relations orchestrated by corporate enterprise, I 
focus here on corporate directors, because this allows for narrowed and particular treatment of 
the issues, and because corporate law specifies that it is the directors who ultimately bear 
responsibility for corporate operations.  See 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141(a) (“The business and 
affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board 
of directors.”). 
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social relation between shareholders and directors. In so doing, it 
also commands a particular social relation between directors and 
consumers. The most widely used corporate law in the United 
States, the law of Delaware, requires directors to manage their firms 
solely in the interests of shareholders.59  Directors are permitted to 
deal solicitously with non-shareholders, but only where doing so is 
“rationally related” to furthering the shareholder interest.60 Workers 
may be treated well if it will draw more productive workers to the 
firm, quality goods may be produced in environmentally responsible 
ways if doing so will attract consumers. But where the shareholder 
interest is in tension with non-shareholders, the shareholder interest 
must always prevail. The ambivalent meanings of our consumer 
culture reflect the reality that corporations sometimes serve 
shareholders by discerning and serving consumer desires, and 
corporations sometimes serve shareholders by exploiting consumers. 
It is not always possible, indeed, it is usually impossible, to identify 
and distinguish these two kinds of profit-seeking operations just by 
looking at the consumption behavior. Who can tell?61 But there can 
be no doubt that both dynamics are ubiquitous. From a corporate 
law perspective, it makes no difference how the profits are made. 
Good faith for the shareholders is all Delaware will say. 
Corporate law’s agnosticism as to how profits are made is 
obscured through the social relations of consumption which that 
same law incarnates. It is obscured because corporate directors are 
 
 59.  See John Armour et. al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345 (2012) 
(giving evidence of, and summarizing explanations for, Delaware’s dominance).  Some 
corporate law scholars disagree with my doctrinal characterization and insist that Delaware law 
provides directors with latitude to manage firms in the service of non-shareholders even where 
doing so compromises shareholder interests. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE MYTH 95 (2012). I show why shareholder primacy really is the law of Delaware in 
David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 27; see also David G. Yosifon, 
Corporate Aid of Governmental Authority: History and Analysis of an Obscure Power in 
Delaware Corporate Law, 10 U. ST. THOMAS. L.J. 1086 (2013) (extending this assessment). 
 60.  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1985) (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, 
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”). 
   61.  Is smoking cool, or is it manipulative?  Is junk food delicious, or pernicious? One 
cannot say, in an ethically serious way, just by observing the consumption of cigarettes or junk 
food. Nor, I think, can one say so from an evaluation of tobacco or fast food advertising alone.  
See supra text accompanying notes 46–49. 
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not snakes, and they are not devils.  They are human.  Modern 
psychologists have confirmed what Adam Smith wrote in his Theory 
of Moral Sentiments: “Man [and woman] naturally desire[], not only 
to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural 
and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, not only to be hated, 
but to be hateful.”62 Directors are motivated to see themselves as 
serving consumers, not mulcting them.63 They are keen to see their 
corporate operations always as serving consumers, even though we 
must expect that this is not, in fact, what they are always doing. 
Directors avoid the dissonance that might otherwise arise in trying 
to both serve their shareholders and self-affirm as “lovely,” by 
patronizing overly sanguine conceits about the nature of their work.   
 In public settings, and no doubt in private ones too, corporate 
directors routinely insist that they are committed to ensuring that 
their firms operate as good corporate citizens.64 That profit is not 
their guiding light, certainly not their only one, but rather, that they 
are committed to serving all of their stakeholders, including their 
workers and consumers. A familiar trope involves a director 
reviewing the arduous, but finally heroic, struggle their firm 
 
 62.  ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 166 (Arlington House 1969) 
(1759); see also Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 51, at 90–95 
(reviewing social psychology research on the motive to self-affirm). 
 63.  See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 51, at 94–95 
(emphasizing the self-affirmation motive at that heart of human psychology). There has been 
little systematic or deep study of boards of directors as decision-making bodies as such. “The 
dynamics of boardroom teams—including how each director contributes to the cognitive 
output of the board as a whole—remain . . . shrouded in mystery.” The Second International 
Conference on Engaged Management Scholarship, Solange Charas, Boardroom Theater: Actors, 
Actions and Their Consequences 4 (2012). We do not have deep studies informing us about 
how directors think or how boards make decisions. This is perhaps necessarily so, as Board 
deliberations are confidential, even secretive, by their nature. The picture we sketch of this 
factor in the social relations of consumption must be drawn from corporate governance law, 
and fundamental insights of social psychology. 
 64.  See David G. Yosifon, The Dalai Lama and Corporate Law, THE CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PODCAST (2014) (downloaded using iTunes) (describing and 
critiquing a public dialogue between directors of Silicon Valley corporations and His Holiness 
the Dalai Lama on the relationship between corporate operations and compassion); see also 
David G. Yosifon, Is Corporate Patriotism a Virtue?, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L LAW 
(forthcoming 2016) (arguing that the commands of shareholder primacy conflict with morally 
legitimate imperatives of patriotic conscience, and suggesting reforms that would allow firms 
to operate more patriotically). 
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undertook, listening to community groups, engaging critics, and 
finally ceasing the doing of some nefarious thing: dumping, bribing, 
skimping, or misleading (the nefarious thing having inevitably begun 
under a previous management team).65 It always starts out as a story 
about the company doing the right thing, irrespective of the cost. 
But then comes the inevitable deus ex machina, wherein the director 
reveals that it turned out that the socially responsible course was also 
profitable for shareholders.  Because it encouraged buy-in among 
workers and consumers and the community. The director’s vignette 
then becomes the urtext for that occasion’s discussion of socially 
irresponsible corporate activity generally. The solution, plainly, is to 
get corporations to perceive that the responsible thing to do is also 
the profitable thing to do, just as happened in the director’s vignette. 
Profit sacrifice is celebrated as no sacrifice at all, and corporate law is 
vindicated as being socially responsible. 
Corporate directors regularly make this claim, that there is 
coherence—that there is integrity—between the interests of 
shareholders and those of non-shareholders. A prominent example is 
found in the book Conscious Capitalism, by John Mackey, founder, 
and a director, of Whole Foods Markets, Inc.66 Mackey, a strong 
proponent of shareholder primacy in corporate governance, 
 
 65.  Case studies of corporate social responsibility campaigns reveal a pattern in which 
the worst offenders in a particular area relating to social responsibility are forced to confront 
their misdeeds by activists and interest groups, and then ultimately become responsible 
corporate leaders in the area. See Cristina A. Cedillo Torres et. al., Four Case Studies on 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Do Conflicts Affect a Company’s Corporate Social Responsibility 
Policy?, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 51, 52 (2012). Some observers see this as evidence of the 
effectiveness of contemporary corporate social responsibility pressures. Id. The pattern appears 
to tract the aphorism attributed to Mahatma Gandhi: “First they ignore you, then they laugh 
at you, then they fight you, then you win.” This may be a predictable sequence of steps for 
activists in various domains. And the fact that the campaign “win[s]” in the end says 
something laudable about the campaign and the campaigners. But it says nothing 
commendable about the system in which the activists are operating. The fact that Gandhi was 
ultimately successful in establishing Indian independence is hardly evidence that the British 
imperial system was operating as well as might be hoped. Similarly, the success of activist 
movements aimed at forcing socially responsible policies on corporations should not be read as 
evidence of the appropriateness of the prevailing corporate governance system. 
 66.  The book is co-authored by Raj Sisodia, a marketing professor at Bentley 
University. JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING THE 
HEROIC SPIRIT OF BUSINESS (2013). I refer to Mackey in the text for ease of usage, and 
because he is an influential director of a large, publicly traded corporation. No disrespect (nor 
letting off the hook) is intended to Sisodia. 
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proclaims that business is most profitable when it “consciously” cares 
for non-shareholders: “In addition to creating social, cultural, 
intellectual, physical, ecological, emotional, and spiritual value for all 
stakeholders, conscious businesses also excel at delivering exceptional 
financial performance over the long term.”67 Mackey even predicts 
that because rapacious firms are less profitable, “[e]ventually, the 
marketplace will weed out businesses that aren’t sufficiently 
conscious.”68 But this is plainly wrong.  While profit maximization 
surely does not inevitably involve trade-offs between stakeholders, it 
is also true that sometimes profits can maximize through 
“insufficiently conscious” business practices.  Indeed, if the weeds 
can make some profits, then they are likely to persist, even if other 
plants prove more profitable. Over fifty years ago, Armen Alchian 
showed that firms do not need to maximize profits in order to 
survive, they just need to make some profits.69 If there is profit to be 
made in exploitative conduct, and “conscious” firms decline to reap 
it, the exploitative conduct will still happen. The profits will be 
made, and the firms that make them will continue to do business. 
Even if it were true that shareholder primacy in corporate 
governance will “eventually” weed out firms that are not socially 
 
 67.  Id. at 35. 
 68.  Id. at 276–77, 289. The only support Mackey offers for his claim that firms 
pursuing all stakeholder interests are more profitable than those that do not is his assertion 
that there are “dozens” of high-profile, successful firms operating under the tenants of 
conscious capitalism. Id. Dozens! Cf. Tobias Fünke, a fictional character in the television 
comedy Arrested Development who suffers from “never nudism,” a psychological affliction 
which compels him to never be fully nude, even when he showers. As the story develops, 
Tobias comes to embrace his identity as a “Never Nude.” In a scene that has become an 
internet “meme,” he holds forth at a Never Nude rally and bellows: “There are dozens of us. 
Dozens!” The line is played for laughs, and it gets them. Mackey’s “dozens” was probably not 
meant for laughs. See Arrested Development: In God We Trust (Fox television broadcast Dec. 
21, 2003). 
 69.  See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. 
ECON. 211, 213 (1950) (“Realized positive profits, not maximum profits, are the mark of 
success and viability. It does not matter through what process of reasoning or motivation such 
success was achieved. The fact of its accomplishment is sufficient. This is the criterion by which 
the economic system selects survivors: those who realize positive profits are the survivors; those 
who suffer losses disappear.”); see also Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political 
and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 579–80 (1990) (summarizing reasons why 
markets cannot force the reform of underperforming firms, including, perhaps most 
importantly, the inefficacy of markets for control, “given the ability of target managers to 
impose substantial costs and risks on unwanted bidders”). 
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conscious, we are still left among the weeds in our present world, 
and at all times sooner than “eventually.” Shareholder primacy 
apologists such as Mackey never say what kind of time-horizon they 
have in mind when promising convergence of stakeholder interests in 
the long-term. Is it a decade? A century? Millennia? As John 
Maynard Keynes put it, “[i]n the long-run we are all dead.”70 How 
long until that fated day, when the profitability of conscious firms 
will “weed out” exploitative firms? Throughout his book, Mackey 
frankly acknowledges that “[i]f a business seeks only to maximize 
profits to ensure shareholder value and does not attend to the health 
of the entire system, short-term profits may indeed result, perhaps 
lasting many years . . . .”71 Many years may be all some people, 
values, or ecosystems have left. In the shorter-term, individual 
suffering, family disintegration, community collapse, and cultural 
decay may beckon. Consumers suffering exploitation in their 
eclipsing youth can take no comfort in the misty legend that “many 
years” from now shareholder-oriented firms will figure out that 
better profits are to be had by treating non-shareholders 
with dignity.72 
Recently, several states, including Delaware, have adopted 
“Public Benefit Corporation” statutes which create a new form of 
business entity that requires directors to balance the interests of 
shareholders and non-shareholders in corporate operations.73 The 
very existence of these Public Benefit Corporation statutes expresses 
the law’s understanding that socially responsible operations are not 
 
 70.  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 71.  MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 66, at 52 (emphasis added). 
 72.  “Eventually” is a reservation that significantly undermines the claim that 
shareholder primacy is consonant with non-shareholder interests. But the weakness of the 
“eventually” gambit evades scrutiny by mis-resonating with moral attitudes that celebrate 
“delayed gratification,” and criticize the hedonism of instant gratification. This illogically 
makes the “long term” feature of Mackey’s argument seem more impressive, rather than less. 
 73.  See 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 365(a) (“The board of directors shall manage or direct 
the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the 
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the 
corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its 
certificate of incorporation.”); see also David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is 
the Public Benefit Corporation Trivial? (2015) (draft on file with author) (assessing ways in 
which the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation statute affects how the Delaware General 
Corporation Law should be interpreted). 
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really always consonant with profits. The fact that corporate directors 
are not rushing, or even crawling,74 to adopt these organizational 
forms is evidence that they somehow know that profits and social 
responsibility are not always aligned, even if they will not 
acknowledge it clearly to themselves or others. The capital markets’ 
failure to abandon conventional corporations to invest in forms that 
ensure equal attention to non-shareholding stakeholders gives the 
“acid bath of economics” to delusions that social responsibility and 
shareholder profits are always the same thing.75 But the failure to 
recognize and speak the truth of stakeholder dis-alignment, and the 
truth of shareholder privilege in corporate governance, obfuscates 
the nature of the producer-consumer corporate relationship, 
infecting consumer culture with dis-integrity and ambiguity. 
 
 74.  See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s 
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 249−50 (2014) (“Overall, very few companies have 
opted into the public benefit corporation and its variations.”). 
 75.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 437 (1992) (“Clear thinking . . . is 
obstructed by layers of . . . ideology, superstition, and prejudice that 
the acid bath of economics can help us peel away.”). Of course the new social enterprise forms 
were hardly necessary to demonstrate this, since business has long had available to it standard 
forms of “for-profit” corporations that are more solicitous of non-shareholding interests than 
Delaware. For example, the New York statute has long stated that 
(b) In taking action . . . a director shall be entitled to consider, without 
limitation . . . the effects that the corporation’s actions may have in the short-term 
or in the long-term upon any of the following: . . . (ii) the corporation’s current 
employees . . . (iv) the corporation’s customers and creditors; and (v) the ability of 
the corporation to provide, as a going concern, goods, services, employment 
opportunities and employment benefits and otherwise to contribute to the 
communities in which it does business. 
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 2015). The reason that states like New York can get 
away with this kind of non-shareholderist language is precisely because Delaware dominates so 
completely in the sale of corporate charters. These states could probably not attract corporate 
business even if they copied and pasted Delaware’s statute and case law into its own law. 
Therefore, these states might as well enjoy whatever expressive social responsibility comes with 
having multi-stakeholder language on its books. Indeed, the history behind these permissive 
provisions in these states’ corporate codes is that they were developed in response to agitation 
from labor groups that were panicked by the mass layoffs attendant to the wave of profit-
maximizing corporate takeovers in the 1980s. Labor groups were relatively influential in these 
states, and corporations were genuinely disinterested in what these states’ corporate statutes 
said because they were not using them anyway, so it was relatively easy to get this multi-
stakeholder language into these states’ laws. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical 
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 
(1992) (surveying statutes). There are no cases interpreting these permissive, multi-stakeholder 
provisions, because they are not real corporate law. 
YOSIFON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2016  3:35 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1332 
Human nature dictates that directors believe they serve 
shareholders by serving consumers. And corporate law dictates that 
those beliefs be formed in ignorance. Corporate law prescribes and 
constrains the way that directors think and talk about corporate 
decision-making. Directors have an obligation to become informed 
about and to deliberate on the consequences of corporate policy for 
the shareholders.76 Directors’ minds and voices are thus actively 
turned, by legal injunction, to contemplation of the shareholder 
interest. At the same time, corporate law forbids directors from 
giving supportive voice to policies that would aid non-shareholding 
stakeholders at the expense of shareholders.77 Square pegs of social 
responsibility that cannot fit the round hole of shareholder primacy 
are left unplaced in the corporate conscience. While shareholder 
primacy reigns, corporate social responsibility in the boardroom is 
“the love that dare not speak its name.”78 And if it cannot speak, 
then it cannot fully flourish, and cannot be contrasted with or 
balanced against the one love that is normative for directors: the 
shareholder interest. This limitation on directorial discourse 
necessarily influences the mind, conscience, and decisions of 
corporate directors. The combination of forced speaking, on behalf 
of shareholders, and forbidden speaking, about non-shareholders, 
gives shape to a particular kind of knowledge and practice, and 
precludes others. It keeps directors thinking carefully about the 
shareholder interest, and thinking only casually about non-
shareholder interests.79 
 
 76.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 77.  In every reported case where directors have admitted to sacrificing shareholder 
interests in favor of other stakeholder concerns, Delaware courts have found that the directors 
violated their fiduciary obligations to shareholders. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that directors were not permitted 
to privilege creditor interests over shareholder interests in the course of selling their company, 
which the directors admitted to doing); Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“I [Chancellor William Chandler] cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate 
policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a 
for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders . . . .”). 
 78.  LORD ALFRED DOUGLAS, Two Loves, in THE CHAMELEON (1894). 
 79.  The law of fiduciary duty thus engenders affective connotations between directors 
and shareholders. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 
591, 599 (2001). But it mutes other affective processes. Empathy is developed by projecting 
one’s own thoughts and feelings about a situation onto others, who we assume must feel 
things similarly to the way that we do. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Behavioral Biology, 
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By limiting the form and content of directorial deliberation, 
corporate law ensures that the cognitive dissonance that might 
otherwise emerge in the simultaneous pursuits of profit-maximizing 
duty and self-affirmation finds instead easy harmonious resolution in 
directors’ minds, and in the corporate conscience.80 The particular 
construction of this coherence is shaped by corporate governance 
law, which pushes directors to devote their scarce cognitive and 
emotional resources in favor of the shareholder interest. We must 
suppose, at least at the margin, that the law of fiduciary duty will 
push dissonance reduction in a manner that privileges the 
shareholder interest, at the expense of other values.   
An experiment by the social psychologist Dan Ariely captures the 
kind of boardroom shading that I have in mind. Ariely and his 
collaborators designed an experiment called the “Dots Test” which 
put subjects before a computer screen that flashed a series of images 
of squares with dots inside of them.81 Sometimes the dots were 
distributed with more to the left side of the square, and sometimes 
they were distributed with more to the right.82  For each image, 
subjects were told to determine which side of the square had more 
dots.  The images flashed too quickly for subjects to actually count 
the dots, so they were forced to make uncertain judgments. Subjects 
were told they would receive one cent every time they hit the 
computer key indicating more dots on the left side, and five cents 
every time they hit the key indicating more dots on the right side. 
 
the Rational Actor Model, and the New Feminist Agenda 11 (Geo. Wash. U. L. Sch. Pub. L. 
and Legal Stud. Res. Paper, Series Paper No. 276, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=98448 (citing contemporary studies of empathy). Directorial loyalty 
involves putting shareholders above other stakeholders, and it also involves putting 
shareholders above directors themselves. For the fiduciary, “thought of self [is] to be 
renounced, however hard the abnegation.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 
1928) (Cardozo, J.) (explaining loyalty). This suppression of the self marginalizes the 
mechanism that produces empathy. This may be the secret mission of the duty of loyalty. It is 
not the selfishness but rather the selflessness of the fiduciary that makes him such a danger to 
others. The selfless individual is not more capable of empathy, he is less capable of it. The 
fiduciary relationship intensifies one’s devotion to a particular person or group, but diminishes 
one’s capacity to be concerned for others. 
 80.  On the importance of dissonance avoidance in contemporary models of human 
cognition and decision-making, see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 
51, at 107–25 (summarizing social psychological studies). 
 81.  See DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY 126–30 (2012). 
 82.  Id. at 127–29. 
YOSIFON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2016  3:35 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1334 
Subjects were also told that they would not be evaluated for the 
correctness of their answers.83 Ariely summarizes his scheme: “[b]y 
creating this skewed payment system, we gave the participants an 
incentive to see reality in a slightly different way . . . . [T]hey were 
faced with a conflict between producing an accurate answer and 
maximizing their profit.”84 Subjects then responded to two-hundred 
images flashed in rapid succession. 
A silly, stylized rational-actor model of human behavior would 
predict that subjects would systematically hit the key indicating more 
dots on the right, because their decisions were unreviewable, and five 
cents is better than one cent. But as realistic models of human 
decision-making predict, this is not what happened. Instead, the 
experimenters found a widespread tendency towards a little bit of 
cheating, and no self-conscious recognition of cheating.85 That is, 
people were biased towards the higher-paying interpretation of what 
they were seeing, but they viewed themselves as making fair and 
objective assessments. Of perhaps particular relevance to the 
decision-making dynamics of the boards of our most powerful 
corporations, Ariely found that “creative” individuals were more 
prone to click on the right (higher paying) key than were other types 
of people. The greatest divergence between “creative” types and the 
baseline population came in squares with a small difference in the 
number of dots on the left and right. The creative types were not 
more prone to engage in “bold” lies, but rather, were more prone to 
“lie,” to themselves and the experimenters, at the margins. Ariely 
concludes: “the link between creativity and dishonesty seems related 
to the ability to tell ourselves stories about how we are doing the 
 
 83.  In corporate law terms, subjects were given business judgment rule protection for 
their answers on the dots test. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (noting that 
under the “business judgment rule,” courts will not evaluate the substance of business 
decisions that corporate boards make in good faith). 
 84.  ARIELY, supra note 81, at 129. 
 85.  Id. at 163–91.  Ariely argues that there is a fundamental human tendency to be 
“morally flexible” in this way (it is “hardwired,” if you must), but he emphasizes that “cultural 
context” can influence the “magnitude of the fudge factor that is considered acceptable for any 
particular domain.” Id. at 242. Again, by “acceptable,” he means acceptable not just to 
observers, but to the liar him or herself. 
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right thing, even when we are not.”86 Governing under the 
substantive and procedural dictates of shareholder primacy, directors 
can privilege the shareholder interest, and short-change other 
shareholders, all the while subjectively believing that their decisions 
are not just profitable for shareholders, but fair to everyone involved. 
Of course, it would be naïve to think that directors always 
actually put their shareholders first, consciously or subconsciously. 
Sometimes it seems obvious that corporate directors are ignoring the 
law of corporate governance and are sacrificing corporate profits in 
favor of some other value.87 These exceptions further highlight the 
dis-integrity brought on by the rule. Especially in such instances, the 
law of corporate governance, with its insistence of shareholder 
primacy, forces opacity, and disingenuousness into the deliberative 
process in the boardroom, making it impossible to draw anything 
but muddied conclusions about the meaning and significance of 
corporate operations in our culture. 
Consider, for example, this tale that comes out of the sub-prime 
mortgage debacle. In the fall of 2008, Bank of America was poised 
to buy the investment bank Merrill Lynch, which was going down in 
a sea of bad debt.88 After a merger agreement was in place between 
the two firms, Merrill Lynch’s financial position worsened (from an 
already dire situation). Bank of America’s board considered 
abandoning the merger, which it may have had the right to do under 
the standard “material adverse change” clause of the merger 
 
 86.  Id. at 172. Interestingly, Ariely’s research team found no correlation between 
higher or lower “intelligence” as such and the tendency to cheat in a manner that deviated 
from the norm. Id. at 176. 
 87.  Doug Baird and Todd Henderson argue that corporate directors routinely engage 
in behavior that is not even arguably consistent with the idea that directors owe fiduciary 
obligations exclusively to shareholders. Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other 
People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309 (2008). One example they give is the practice of firms 
electively filing for bankruptcy, which provides an orderly structure for dealing with creditor 
claims, but extinguishes shareholder claims altogether. Id. at 1320. My claim is not that the 
shareholder primacy norm precludes boards from ever engaging in socially responsible 
decision-making. Rather, my view is that the shareholder primacy norm distorts the discourse 
and precludes the kind of completeness in deliberation that would allow for better, more 
coherent decisions. 
 88.  See Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, 
Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
661 (2010). 
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agreement.89 Bank regulators within the federal government, 
however, believed that a collapse of the Bank of America-Merrill 
Lynch merger would devastate already staggering credit markets, 
threatening to destroy the American economy (and possibly the 
global economy).90 That is, regulators were concerned that a 
privately useful decision by Bank of America’s board might be 
socially irresponsible. This the regulators communicated to the 
directors. Also, the regulators communicated that if the board 
insisted on exercising its right to terminate the merger, the 
government might feel compelled to exercise its power under federal 
banking regulations to remove the incumbent members of the Bank 
of America board, in the public interest.91 
Lo and behold, upon further deliberation, the Bank of America 
directors decided they would, after all, go ahead with the merger.92 
In his engaging review of this episode, Professor Robert Rhee 
concludes that the directors were obviously influenced by the 
regulators’ threat to replace the board, and it seems likely that the 
directors were also genuinely concerned about the pressing social 
interests at stake in their decision.93  However clear this is, it is even 
clearer that the social responsibility implicated in their decision 
played no part in the explicit deliberation of the board. The minutes 
reflect that the board concluded the decision was in the shareholder 
interest.94 The statements of individual board members testifying 
before Congress reflect the same. Those minutes and that testimony 
were entirely predictable. They could have been written by anyone 
familiar with the board’s decision, but unfamiliar with the board’s 
deliberation. This is because any other explanation of the decision 
would have been a confession that the directors had violated their 
fiduciary obligations to their shareholders. And yet the statements 
appear to be entirely unbelievable (except, perhaps, to the board 
members themselves). At best, our highest-level corporate discourse 
 
 89.  See id. at 669–72. 
 90.  See id. 
 91.  See id. 
 92.  See id. 
 93.  Id. at 684 (“The board minutes plainly state that the government’s threat did not 
influence the board members, though such self-serving notice, by itself, cannot be 
taken seriously.”). 
 94.  See id. 
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about this pressing social crisis was had through winks and nods, 
dumb and indecorous innuendo. In this way our corporate law 
creates corporate speech on corporate social responsibility that is at 
once entirely predictable, totally unbelievable, and utterly useless. 
 A critical (realistic) observer of the Bank of America-Merrill 
Lynch transaction is forced into incredulity or cynical amusement 
reading the directors’ assertions that the decision to proceed with 
the merger was made because they decided it was in the 
shareholders’ interest.95 Always our discourse on corporate 
operations must be subsumed within this clouded mindset. It is 
corporate law, through the shareholder primacy norm, which keeps 
our corporate directors from talking openly and honestly about what 
is at stake and what should wisely be done about it. It is corporate 
law that imposes this cynicism on our conversations about what 
corporations are and what they are doing. The shareholder primacy 
norm in corporate governance creates the perverse situation in which 
serious assessment of corporate decision-making relating to socially 
pressing matters must begin by discounting the actual deliberations 
by directors making the decision.  
 Rhee, reflecting a general consensus among corporate law 
scholars, writes that “[t]hese elisions are the white lies of corporate 
law, not malicious or mendacious, but perhaps necessary to maintain 
a proper decorum of law and policy.”96 But if these lies are necessary 
to maintain a proper decorum in the very domain where law and 
policy most explicitly condemns lying (“[n]ot honesty alone, but the 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard”),97 
perhaps the decorum is masking something indecorous in law and 
policy. If we cannot trust that what is said in the boardroom is the 
real story, then how can we make sense of the corporate decisions 
that come out of them? What kind of meaning, other than a 
confused and indeterminate one, can we take from corporate 
conduct? Our current corporate governance law, together with 
attendant theory, norms, and ethics, practically requires, and 
certainly encourages, this kind of insincerity. This breeds cynicism 
 
 95.  See id. at 672. 
 96.  Id. at 698. 
 97.  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (providing a classic 
exposition of the meaning of fiduciary obligation). 
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and skepticism, which become core features of corporate capitalism’s 
consumer culture.  
V. PRESCRIPTIVE INTEGRITY IN CORPORATE LAW AND 
CONSUMER CULTURE 
Nobody wants to return to the “penurious self-sufficiency of the 
household system,”98 much less the dreary, limited cultural life it 
contained.99 Corporate law critics should recognize, respect, and help 
advance the transcendent power of consumerism. Reformers seeking 
to constrain the exploitative aspects of consumerism must eschew 
prescriptions that threaten to cripple the efficient production of 
goods and services that the corporate form provides. Critics must 
pursue their progressive aims without getting trapped in the role of 
the joyless scold who seeks to censor consumer marketing that 
deploys sex, humor, or whimsy in “misleading” ways.100 The 
challenge is to find a way to improve upon the quality of consumer 
culture without limiting its creativity and freedom. 
Some corporate critics seek to do more than censor. Sonya Katyal 
explores the emergence of (what she calls) “semiotic disobedience” 
as a response to the corporate control of cultural meaning.101 
“Semiotic disobedience” is the practice of disrupting and re-
appropriating corporate control of social meaning through “culture 
 
 98.  See ROBERTSON, supra note 37, at 104. 
 99.  Of course some people and sub-cultures in our society do choose a life of material 
privation and self-sufficiency. See, e.g., SCOTT DANNEMILLER, THE YEAR WITHOUT A 
PURCHASE (2015) (memoir of a family’s experiment of dropping out of consumer culture). 
But the meaning of such a life is very different when it is chosen than when it is the only 
option society contains. 
 100.  See, e.g., my own earlier proposal to address the obesity epidemic by prescribing a 
“tombstone” advertising regime for junk-food products, which would limit advertising of such 
goods to black lettering on white background, describing in simple, precise terms the item 
offered, its ingredients, price, and place of provision, in David G. Yosifon, Resisting Deep 
Capture: The Commercial Speech Doctrine and Junk-Food Advertising to Children, 39 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 507 (2006) [hereinafter Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture]. 
 101.  Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (2006).  
Katyal’s phrase references the idea of “semiotic democracy” developed by the media studies 
scholar, John Fiske. “[S]emiotic democracy” stands for the proposition that language, symbols, 
and all manner of commercial expression are subject to reinterpretation by recipients of such 
expression, in ways that may dramatically alter the speakers’ intended meaning. Id. (citing 
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 
CAL. L. REV. 125, 139 (1993)). 
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jamming” activities, including unauthorized use of intellectual 
property to convey anti-corporate personal or political messages.102 
Semiotic disobedience treats as a scarce resource the physical 
embodiments of expression, especially in the public sphere, and its 
attitude laudably recognizes the limited cognitive capacity of 
speakers and listeners, which traditional First Amendment discourse 
has been loath to address. This is culture jamming, not one more 
contribution to an imagined free-flowing river of meaning.103 
But “semiotic disobedience” is no way to run a country. Its 
proponents, and other corporate antagonists ranging from the Tea 
Party members to activists in the Occupy movement, speak in 
desperate terms about the role of corporations in our society, terms 
that I fear increasingly resonate with widening swaths of Americans. 
I am looking for a constructive way of responding to this 
desperation. A thoughtful, peaceful, deliberative approach to 
renegotiating the meaning of consumer culture might better take 
place through the reform of corporate governance law.  
Many academic proponents of shareholder primacy in corporate 
governance acknowledge that their preferred regime creates an 
incentive for firms to overreach in dealing with potentially vulnerable 
stakeholders, such as workers or consumers.104 However, shareholder 
primacists insist that this problem should be addressed through 
reliance on external governmental regulation aimed at containing 
these kinds of abuses, such as labor laws, and consumer protection 
statutes, rather than reform of corporate governance law. 
Government regulation of that sort, they insist, will force 
shareholder-primacy firms to pursue profits in non-exploitative ways. 
In previous work, I have argued that this external “general 
welfare legislation” response to the consumer agency problem does 
not add up, even on the canonical account’s own terms.105 
 
  102.  See generally id. 
 103.  See Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 100, at 599–601 (insisting that 
First Amendment theory must fully grapple with a fundamental problem that it too often 
refuses to acknowledge: the cognitive and temporal limitations on human speech 
and listening). 
 104.  See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 68–72 (insisting that corporate exploitation 
of non-shareholders should be cured by external regulation, not corporate governance law). 
 105.  See, e.g., David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate 
Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197 (2011). 
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Corporations seek profits for shareholders not only in “markets,” but 
also in the legislative arena, by working to stunt the development of 
the “general welfare legislation” that shareholder primacists insist is 
necessary to constrain the corporate overreach they acknowledge is 
endemic to their system. The logic of collective action suggests that 
corporations—relatively small in number, focused in purpose, led by 
talented professionals—will routinely prevail over widely dispersed 
workers, consumers, environmentalists, and communities, in the 
competition for regulatory favor.106 This problem has been ossified 
by the ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission,107 
which specifies that corporations have a First Amendment right to 
operate in the political domain.108 Indeed, if it is true that consumer 
culture depoliticizes individual and collective understanding of the 
human predicament, then that would pose an additional challenge to 
the canonical account of shareholder primacy, which presupposes a 
robust political dynamic that can generate a regulatory regime 
capable of constraining the externalizing tendencies of shareholder 
primacy in corporate operations.109 
I urge a reformative program that alters the social relations of 
consumption. The reform I have in mind would require directors to 
sincerely consider the impact of corporate decision-making on 
multiple stakeholders, not simply shareholders. This sincerity gambit 
would regulate the way that corporate law requires directors to speak 
about and to consumers.110 It does not compel or forbid speech on 
particular subjects, nor does it specify the form or content of speech. 
It regulates the deliberative process through which corporate speech 
is generated, and it sets new default rules for what kind of speech 
 
 106.  See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 51. 
 107.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 108.  See also David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-In and the Theory of the Firm, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429, 1449 (2012) [hereinafter Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the Theory 
of the Firm] (“So long as Citizens United is good constitutional law, shareholder primacy is bad 
corporate theory.”); David G. Yosifon, The Citizens United Gambit in Corporate Theory: A 
Reply to Bainbridge on Strine & Walker (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 4-
14, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2510967 (responding to 
Bainbridge’s claims that Citizens United does not raise doubts about the legitimacy of 
shareholder primacy theory). 
 109.  See supra text accompanying notes  10−17. 
 110.  See Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the Theory of the Firm, supra note 108, at 1429. 
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different actors in the corporate nexus are entitled to.111 It is a way of 
getting corporate boards to discuss more openly and honestly what 
their firms are doing. By reforming corporate governance in this way, 
the law can help consumer culture be more honest. It can give 
consumer culture more integrity.112 
Directors would still be charged with pursuing profits for 
shareholders. To till the arid soil, and make beautiful electronics, we 
must use the productive capacity of aggregated capital and 
centralized decision-making that the corporate form provides. 
Without a credible promise of profits, capital will be no more willing 
to participate in corporate operations than would consumers without 
consumption or labor without wages. As an initial guiding principle, 
the law should instruct corporate directors to seek profits for 
shareholders. But that principle should be circumscribed by an 
obligation to actively, honestly, and sincerely undertake that pursuit 
in a way that is mindful of the interests of non-shareholding 
stakeholders in corporate operations. The law should require this 
reflection, then give directors wide latitude in allowing the reflection 
to shape corporate decisions.113 
This is an attempt to influence meaning by orienting motive, 
without controlling content. It avoids the narrowness and blandness, 
the cold social and cultural life, prescribed by a discursive regime 
focused on truth and falsity. We must have sincerity, clarity, and 
straightforwardness at the core of the consumer relationship with the 
firm, so that we can with confidence enjoy the play and exploration 
occasioned by looser speech at the periphery. As Jeffrey Lipshaw 
 
 111.  See David G. Yosifon, Discourse Norms as Default Rules: Structuring Corporate 
Speech to Multiple Stakeholders, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF L.  MED. 189 (2011). 
 112.  See Werner H. Erhard, Michael C. Jensen, & Steve Zaffron, Integrity: A Positive 
Model that Incorporates the Normative Phenomena of Morality, Ethics, and Legality (Harvard 
Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 06–11, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542759 (developing an approach to “integrity” that the authors 
argue will result in more substantial improvement in corporate operations than has been 
accomplished by Jensen’s work on the agency problem). 
 113.  A reform of this sort would require federalizing corporate chartering in the United 
States, or at least a much deeper federal preemption of state corporate governance standards 
than is presently seen under the federal securities laws.  If Delaware were to give up 
shareholder primacy (unthinkable) then another state would quickly offer it, given that states 
can internalize the benefits of charter-sales to their own coffers, while externalizing the costs of 
corporate over-reach to other states or countries.  While states charter corporations, 
shareholder primacy will continue to dominate American consumer culture. 
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notes, “it is not morally wrong to tell a bride [or groom] the white 
lie that she [or he] is beautiful even when she [or he] is not.”114 The 
meaning of the speech, whether it is a lie, puffery, or whimsy, turns 
on the purpose of the speaker. In the corporate context, we can 
change the purpose of the speech, and thus its meaning, without 
constraining its creativity. 
A multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime could be 
institutionalized through the same light-handed but psychologically 
sophisticated mechanisms through which corporate law presently 
imposes its shareholder primacy rule. Adhering to the “business 
judgment rule,” courts do not second-guess the substance of 
business decisions that boards make.115  What courts require is that 
decisions are informed and deliberate. This implies a responsibility to 
listen and to speak. Self-affirmation and dissonance avoidance 
motives push us to conform our beliefs to our behavior, including 
our speech. Note the counter-intuitive order here—it is a crucial 
insight of contemporary psychology. Sometimes we speak without 
thinking very much, or speak to serve some external goal or satisfy 
some external charge, and then we become concerned with making 
our thinking correspond with our speech.116 Studies have shown the 
ease with which this can happen, even when there is an obvious 
external stimulant or inducement to our speech.117 Requiring 
directors to express an obligation to multiple stakeholders can stoke 
within them such a commitment.  The corporate soul is already 
made through this kind of confessional discourse, and it can be 
remade that way: 
[T]he agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks 
[the director] (for it is he who is constrained), but in the one who 
listens and says nothing [the law, the beneficiary] . . . . And this 
 
 114.  Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Of Fine Lines, Blunt Instruments, and Half-Truths: Business 
Acquisition Agreements and the Right to Lie, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 431, 457 n.124 (citing 
Jonathan Sacks, The White Lie, in COVENANT AND CONVERSATION: THOUGHTS ON THE 
WEEKLY PARSHA FROM THE CHIEF RABBI (Dec. 25, 2004), http://www.chiefrabbi.org/ 
thoughts/vayechi5765.pdf.). 
 115.  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 106–29 (explaining and justifying the business 
judgment rule). 
 116.  See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 51, at 107–11 
(reviewing studies). 
 117.  See id.  (reviewing studies). 
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discourse of truth finally takes effect, not in the one who receives it, 
but in the one from whom it is wrested.118 
The new Public Benefit Corporation statutes do not provide any 
redress to non-shareholders for corporate governance failures. 
Delaware, not famous for lucidity in its statutory drafting, took 
unusual pains to be clear on this point: “A director of a public 
benefit corporation shall not . . . have any duty to any person on 
account of any interest of such person in the public benefit or public 
benefits identified in the certificate of incorporation . . . .”119 My 
approach does not envision much enforcement by consumers, or 
other constituencies, in a multi-stakeholder corporate governance 
regime, but it envisions more than nothing. Under a multi-
stakeholder regime, directors would have a duty to become informed 
and deliberate on the impact of corporate decisions on multiple 
stakeholders. If that obligation were met, courts would not second-
guess directors’ choices. However, under prevailing law, if directors 
do not satisfy their process obligations in good faith, they lose 
business judgment rule protection and have the burden of 
demonstrating that their decisions were entirely fair to the 
corporation and its shareholders. Similarly, in the reform I imagine, 
directors who fail to engage in a good faith deliberative process in 
corporate decision-making would expose themselves to liability 
unless they could demonstrate that the decision was fair to all 
stakeholders involved. 120 
Different institutional details could be worked out through this 
basic framework. Beneath a certain size of operations, it may be 
 
 118.  1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 62 
(Random House 1990) (1978). Or, if you will not have the Foucault, see Lawrence Mitchell 
making the same point with a lawyer’s clarity: “[t]o understand the importance of being 
trusted is to understand the way in which the responsibility for trust reposed can affect 
character. It can create virtue where little had previously existed.” Lawrence E. Mitchell, The 
Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 599 (2001). 
 119.  8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 365(b) (emphasis added). 
 120.  Within a multi-stakeholder governance regime it will have to be acknowledged that 
different stakeholder interests will sometimes be in tension. Directors will at times be forced to 
make hard choices. We can be confident that they will be able to make hard choices between 
competing interests, because they already do this all the time even under the shareholder 
primacy norm, for example, with respect to shareholders with competing risk tolerances, or 
time-horizon preferences. Directors are able to manage these conflicting interests presently 
because the substance of their decisions is non-reviewable. 
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desirable to maintain a shareholder primacy default, in order not to 
lose the catalytic power of the entrepreneurial incentive. This 
suggestion apes existing federal regulatory practices, which only 
apply to corporate operations that have become large enough to be 
economically and socially relevant on a national scale.121 Even once 
the multi-stakeholder governance threshold is reached, it still need 
only be a default, one from which corporations can opt out of 
through engagement with extra-market processes, such as a vote by 
non-shareholding stakeholders who have “backed into” a fiduciary 
treatment by the firm. Through such mechanisms a multi-
stakeholder firm could turn to governance on behalf of only its 
shareholders, its workers, or its consumers. Of primary importance in 
the design of business organizations is not whether governance rules 
are mandatory or mutable. What is crucial is what the default rule 
will be.122 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Consumer culture is a part of our culture. It is one of the 
important ways that individual and social meaning is made, 
negotiated, and contested, in modern society. It operates alongside 
other important cultures and sub-cultures, but it indisputably is a 
part of how we live now. This is why it is nostalgic, per the Franzen 
epigraph at the start of this Article,123 to ignore it. Policymakers, 
scholars, artists—people concerned with critically assessing the 
human condition—set themselves too small a project if they pass 
over consumer culture. 
Where consumer culture is not ignored, two interpretations 
echo, never far from each other, in the interpretive landscape. 
 
 121.  See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 155–63 (2012) (describing market capitalization thresholds that determine 
when firms become subject to governance regulations under the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank reforms). 
 122.  See Yosifon, supra note 73. It is a common mistake to draw from Ronald Coase’s 
famous article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), the lesson that default 
rules are irrelevant so long as parties subject to them are allowed to bargain to a more desirable 
result. Coase himself emphasized that the main insight of his article was that transaction costs 
are often prohibitively high, and, therefore, getting the default right as a matter of social policy 
is crucially important. 
 123.  See supra text accompanying note 2. 
YOSIFON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2016  3:35 PM 
1309 The Social Relations of Consumption 
 1345 
Consumerism is demeaning and exploitative. Consumerism is 
satisfying and liberating. Those who only celebrate it seem naïve, but 
those who only condemn it lose us in their pretension. Doubtless 
there is an element of truth to both perspectives. Yet this stark 
ambivalence suggests a confusion at the core of our thinking about 
consumer culture. This confusion can be traced to a lack of integrity 
in the social relations of consumption. I have suggested that at its 
core, consumption under corporate capitalism must be understood 
through the same “agency problem” framework that has guided 
corporate theory’s rich understanding of the shareholder’s 
predicament in our society. The separation of production and 
consumption makes the nature of the relationship between producer 
and consumer a principle part of the meaning of consumer culture.  
The law of corporate governance, led by the corporate law of 
Delaware, takes this theoretical problem and makes it live in the 
world. Shareholder primacy in corporate governance law, as it 
operates through human corporate directors, it gives rise to a 
corporate relationship with consumers that is confused, confusing, 
and undesirable. Prevailing corporate governance law encourages 
firms to deal with consumers in an insincere way, and contributes to 
a consumer culture that lacks integrity. 
The social relations of production under simple, affective kin and 
community relations cannot (are unlikely to) produce a consumer 
culture that is transcendent and deeply liberating. The separation of 
production and consumption creates the efficiencies and attenuation 
that are more likely to endow a liberating, pluralistic, experimental 
type of consumer culture. That consumer culture, however, will 
always be haunted by the consumer agency problem so long as 
production and consumption is undertaken under the shareholder 
primacy norm. There will always be, must always be, a suspicion that 
consumer culture is inauthentic, that it lacks integrity, that there is 
manipulation in it. Consumer culture under corporate capitalism 
must then always remain fundamentally ambivalent, or ambiguous, 
constraining its creative and liberating power. 
I have suggested a reform program that would require directors 
of large corporations to actively attend, openly and honestly, to the 
interests of multiple stakeholders, including shareholders, workers, 
and consumers, at the level of firm governance. This is an 
“orienting” approach to improving the quality of consumer culture, 
one that avoids the cultural desert of the censor, even as it ushers in a 
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more sincere system of meaning in consumer culture. The 
“Keynesian consensus” in modern policymaking presumes “more 
consumption is the key to balanced growth in the future.”124 Before 
we can embark on this consumption and enjoy that growth in good 
conscience, we must have some faith and confidence in what it 
means to consume in the corporate system. 
The social relations of consumption are but one aspect of the 
meaning of consumer culture. They explain only a part of the 
mystery of consumption. Endowing these social relations with 
greater integrity will not give us final answers about the value and 
meaning of consumerism. We will still be left with the deeper 
questions: is simplicity or complexity in consumption the better 
route to personal happiness and social justice? Does the quickness 
with which we become bored with a particular consumer delight, 
and start looking for a new one, reflect superficiality in us, or does it 
reflect well on our unquenchable curiosity, showing that the world is 
always short of us, that we are always grasping beyond it? Should we 
buy now or save for later? Can we develop, as has been sought from 
Aristotle to Norman O. Brown, “a science of human nature, able to 
distinguish real human needs from (neurotic) consumer 
demands”?125 Reforming corporate governance law will not answer 
these questions for us. But it may help us finally get to these 
questions, free from the confusions attendant to disjointed social 
relations of consumption. 
 
 124.  LIVINGSTON, AGAINST THRIFT, supra note 20, at x. 
 125.  BROWN, supra note 1, at 256. 
